Product Code Database
Operation Pawan ( Kãryvãhi Pavan, lit. "Operation Wind") was the code name assigned to the operation by the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) to take control of Jaffna from the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), better known as the Tamil Tigers, in late 1987 to enforce the disarmament of the LTTE as a part of the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord. In brutal fighting lasting about three weeks, the IPKF took control of the Jaffna Peninsula from the LTTE, something that the Sri Lankan Army had tried but failed to do. Supported by Indian Army tanks, helicopter gunships and heavy artillery, the IPKF routed the LTTE at the cost of 214 soldiers and officers.
Most Tamil groups, including the Tigers, had not participated in the talks. Only reluctantly did they agree to surrender their arms to the Indian Peace Keeping Force as provided by the Accord. Even so, many separatists did not surrender their weapons, and the situation quickly flared into active confrontation. The Tigers declared their intent to continue armed struggle for an independent Tamil Eelam and refused to disarm. The IPKF soon found itself engaged in a bloody police action against the Tigers, which culminated in the separatists being cornered on the Jaffna Peninsula, at the northern end of the island. The IPKF set out to complete its mission of disarming the LTTE by taking Jaffna by force.
The first IPKF operation was launched on 9 October 1987. Code-named Operation Pawan (Sanskrit for 'Wind'), it was expected to neutralise LTTE operational capability in and around Jaffna. This included the capture or neutralisation of the LTTE's chain of command "Nobody sounded even a Last Post for our dead in Colombo" Gen. Harikat Singh to Josy Joseph. rediff.com which was expected to leave the separatist movement directionless in the face of the impending assault on the LTTE strongholds by the IPKF.
On the nights of 9 and 10 October, the IPKF raided and captured the LTTE radio station at Tavadi and the TV station at Kokkuvil, while the printing presses of two LTTE-sponsored newspapers were destroyed. These operations also led to the capture of nearly 200 Tiger separatists. In retaliation, the LTTE ambushed a Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) convoy near Tellippalai, killing four jawans, as well as an IPKF post at Tellipallai with automatic weapons and mortar fire on an IPKF post. Later that day the Tigers ambushed a 10 Para Commando jeep on patrol, killing all five occupants.
On 10 October the Indian 91st Brigade, consisting of three battalions and led by Brig. J. Ralli, also began its push into Jaffna."The Tamil Militants-Before the Accord and After" Hellmann-Rajanayagam D. Pacific Affairs, Vol. 61, No. 4. (Winter, 1988–1989), pp. 603–619
The operation ended in disaster as the LTTE, having intercepted IPKF radio transmissions, set up an ambush. The heli-dropped troops came under intense fire from LTTE positions, forcing the Mil Mi-8 helicopters to abandon the insertion midway through the operation. During the ensuing battle, which lasted throughout the night, 29 of the 30 Sikh Light Infantry troops and 2 of the 17 commandos were killed in action before detachments of the 65th Armoured Regiment were able to extract the commandos from their defensive positions. After the Sikh Light Infantry platoon's signaller was shot by LTTE snipers early on in the battle, the unit lost contact with the Indian High Command at Palay Air Base. The sole survivor of the platoon, Sepoy Gora Singh, was taken prisoner by the LTTE under the command of Pawan Kashyap. It was not until his subsequent release during the conflict that the fate of the unit was known.
On 15/16 October the IPKF stopped its advance to stabilise the front. Palay, the major operations headquarters for the 54th Infantry Division, was also secured from Tiger attacks. At this time the Indian Air Force undertook a massive airlift to reinforce the 91st with three brigades and heavy equipment, including T-72 tanks and BMP-1 infantry fighting vehicles. Air traffic controllers worked round the clock to fly in troops and equipment. Indian Airlines is said to have contributed to the airlift, using its Boeing 737s to deliver troops. This short interval also saw the introduction of Mi-8 transport helicopters and the first use of the Mi-25 gunships of No. 125 Helicopter Squadron, along with HAL Cheetah utility helicopters. By end of October the IAF had flown 2200 tactical transport and 800 helicopter sorties.
Now reinforced, the IPKF resumed the battle for Jaffna. The tanks and armoured fighting vehicles are said to have been effective protection against anti-personnel mines. However, even with this defence the IPKF advance was torturous in the face of the Tigers' sniper fire. They would take up positions on rooftops, in trees and even in coconut Arecaceae. Equipped with powerful Telescopic sight, they were able to selectively take out officers and radiomen, inflicting a heavy toll and bringing the advance to a grinding halt. Helicopters flying below 2000 feet were also vulnerable, with at least five being shot at and damaged before the Mi-25s took up their offensive role. The IPKF adapted quickly, with its officers taking off the pips of their ranks, wearing and carrying oversize back packs. However, as the advance got bogged down, the battalions, instead of manoeuvring around the defenders, were forced to commit more troops under orders from New Delhi. In addition, the LTTE increasingly began to deploy , taking a further heavy toll on IPKF forces. A frustrated IPKF cut off the power to Jaffna in an attempt to counter this. IPKF communication lines were extensively mined by the LTTE, which further compounded the sometimes perilous situations that the Indian troops faced. It has not before the commandos broke out of the besieged Jaffna port and cleared the heavily mined Navanthurai Coastal Road that a crucial link-up between 1 Maratha Light Infantry in Jaffna Fort and the advancing troops of 41st Brigade could be established that secured the Nallur area. On 21 October the commandos conducted a successful amphibious raid against an LTTE base at Gurunagar. India. Marine Commando Force Special Operations.Com It was also toward the end of the Jaffna campaign that the IPKF started the use of Mi-25s for close air support when they flew against LTTE positions in Chavakachcheri town on 23 October 1987.
This was only the beginning of the IPKF's three-year campaign to neutralise the LTTE. By the time Jaffna fell, the LTTE had merely exfiltrated out of the town, moving south to the jungles of Vavuniya District. Its hardcore militants moved to the safety of the jungle by skirting the Jaffna coast from Point Pedro to Elephant Pass, sheltered by the criss-cross of waterways in the impenetrable Nittkaikulam jungle. In the Jaffna sector, although the LTTE had shifted out of the town itself, it nevertheless harassed the 54th Division's efforts to consolidate its positions using IEDs and anti-personnel mines. In turn, the IPKF was able to disrupt the LTTE's activities with regular raids that led to the capture of large caches of separatist weaponry. Brig. Manjit Singh was later replaced by Brig. J.S. Dhillon, under whom the 54th underwent considerable modifications of its operations routine. Small, highly mobile units became the staple of the 54th's operations.
The IPKF at this point still consisted mostly of an overstretched 54th Division. Following the Jaffna operation, the 36th Infantry Division, along with two additional brigades, took over the Vavuniya sector and the Trincomalee-Batticaloa axis. This relieved the 54th Division which, led by Brig. Singh, could now focus on consolidating the Jaffna sector. The 4th Mountain Division and the 57th Infantry Division were deployed still later in February 1988 to take charge of Vanni and Batticaloa from the 36th.
Prime Minister of India Rajiv Gandhi was assassinated as a fallout of Operation Pawan by LTTE.
|
|
